We consider secure computation of randomized functions by two users, where both the users (Alice and Bob) have inputs, Alice sends a message to Bob over a rate-limited, noise-free link, and then Bob produces the output. We study this problem when privacy is required only against Bob, i.e., from the message, Bob must not learn any information about Alice's input other than what can be inferred by his own input and output. We give a single-letter expression for the optimal rate. We also explicitly characterize securely computable randomized functions when input has full support, which leads to a much simpler expression for the optimal rate. Recently, Data (ISIT 2016) studied the other two cases (first, when privacy is required against both the users; and second, when privacy is required only against Alice) and obtained single-letter expressions for optimal rates in both the scenarios. Yassaee, Gohari, and Aref (IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 2015) studied the case when there is no privacy requirement and obtained a single-letter expression for the optimal rate, when Alice and Bob interact for arbitrary but finite number of rounds, and both of them may produce potentially different outputs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two-user secure computation allows mutually distrusting users to jointly perform computation of their private data interactively, in such a way that no individual learns anything beyond the function value. The study of secure computation was initiated in [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , etc., under computational assumptions, and culminated in a surprising result that, every function (both deterministic and randomized) can be securely computed. However, it turns out that not all two-user functions are computable with information-theoretic security. A combinatorial characterization of securely computable twouser deterministic functions (with perfect security), along-with a generic round-optimal secure protocol, was given in [5] , [6] . Maji et al. [7] , among other things, characterized deterministic functions that have (statistically) secure protocols. An alternative characterization (for perfect security) was given by Narayan et al. [8] using common randomness generated by deterministic secure protocols. A characterization of securely sampleable joint distributions (in terms of Wyner commom information [9] ) was given in [10] , and of securely computable functions, when communication is public and privacy of the function value is against an eavesdropper, was given in [11] .
Interestingly, characterization of securely computable randomized functions is still not known. Recently, Data and Prabhakaran [12] gave a couple of characterizations: for randomized functions that have up to ternary output alphabet, and for randomized functions that are securely computable by up to two-round protocols. Obtaining a full characterization for general randomized functions still remains an elusive problem. Fig. 1 A secure computation problem is described by (p XY , p Z|XY ): Alice and Bob get X n and Y n , respectively, as their inputs, where (X i , Y i )'s are i.i.d. according to p XY , and Bob wants to securely compute Z n according to p Z n |X n Y n (z n |x n , y n ) = Π n i=1 p Z|XY (z i |x i , y i ). Users have access to private randomness. In any secure code, Alice sends a message M over a rate-limited, noise-free link to Bob, and based on (M, Y n ) Bob produceŝ Z n as his output, such that the following conditions are satisfied when blocklength tends to infinity: (i) the 1 -distance between the induced distribution p X n Y nẐn and the desired distribution p X n Y n Z n goes to zero, and (ii) the average amount of additional information Bob learns about X n from the message M goes to zero. There are no external adversaries/eavesdroppers. Kilian [13] , among many other things, gave a characterization when both the users have inputs and only Bob produces the output. Data [14] studied two variations in Kilian's setting (one with privacy against both the users, and other with privacy only against Alice) with a probability distribution on inputs and gave optimal rates for both the problems in perfect security as well as in asymptotic security settings, in the fully interactive setting, where Alice and Bob may interact for arbitrary number of rounds. Orlitsky and Roche [15] studied the case when there is no privacy requirement and obtained a singleletter expression for the optimal rate only for deterministic function computation, when Alice and Bob interact for up to two rounds. Yassaee, Gohari, and Aref [16] considered a more general setting, where Alice and Bob may interact for arbitrary but finite number of rounds, and both of them may produce different outputs of a randomized function, and obtained single-letter expression for the optimal rate. Proof techniques used in [16] are very different than those used in [15] . In this paper we study the remaining case, when privacy is required only against Bob, and give a single-letter expression for the optimal rate, when only one-way communication from Alice to Bob is allowed. We also give explicit characterization of securely computable randomized functions, where inputs have full support, which leads to a much simpler expression for the optimal rate. Proofs in this paper differ in significant ways from that of [14] , but are similar to that of [16] .
The techniques used in our achievability proofs were developed by Yassaee, Aref, and Gohari in [17] (and also used in [16] ), who, along with several new results, also gave alternative and, arguably, simpler proofs for many well-studied problems in network information theory, including channel synthesis problems. Cuff [18] used a different tool (softcovering lemma) to synthesize a memoryless channel with the help of communication and common randomness. Our problem can be viewed as a generalization of channel synthesis problem with privacy. Both [17] and [18] studied several security related problems (secret key generation, wiretap channels, etc.), but all of them guarantee privacy against an eavesdropper. The focus of this paper is on secure computation (where there is no eavesdropper and we want privacy against the users themselves), which is fundamentally different from secure communication or secret key agreement (where we want privacy against an eavesdropper). This paper is organized as follows: in Section II we formally define our problem and state our main theorem for the optimal rate. We also compare the optimal rate needed for an example of a randomized function, when we impose privacy requirement against when there is no privacy requirement. In Section III we prove the theorem. In Section IV we explicitly characterize securely computable randomized functions when inputs have full support, which leads to a more explicit expression for the optimal rate. Using this characterization we give a direct achievability using the Slepian-Wolf coding scheme, along with a much simpler argument of its correctness and privacy. Proofs omitted in this paper are available in the full version [19] .
Notation. For n ∈ N, we write [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. We write capital letters P, Q, etc., to denote random p.m.f.'s and small letters p, q, etc., to denote nonrandom p.m.f.'s. The 1 -distance between two p.m.f.'s p U and q U on the same alphabet U is defined by
For any two sequences of random p.m.f.'s (P U (n) ) n∈N and (Q U (n) ) n∈N (where for every n ∈ N, U (n) takes values in U (n) , which is an arbitrary set, different from U n -the n-fold cartesian product of U), we write
Similarly, for any two sequences of (non-random) p.m.f.'s
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND STATEMENTS OF RESULTS
We study randomized function computation in the two user setting; see Figure 1 . The problem is specified by a pair (p XY , p Z|XY ), where X, Y, Z take values in finite alphabets X , Y, Z, respectively. One user (Alice) has an input sequence X n , other user (Bob) has an input sequence Y n , where (X i , Y i )'s are i.i.d. according to p XY , and Bob wants to compute an output sequence Z n , which should be distributed according to p Z n |X n Y n (z n |x n , y n ) := Π n i=1 p Z|XY (z i |x i , y i ). We relax the correctness condition and allow a small error in function computation: Bob may outputẐ n such that p X n Y nẐn − p X n Y n Z n 1 → 0 as n → ∞. We allow only one sided communication, in which Alice sends a single message to Bob, and then Bob produces an output. Both the users have access to private randomness only. A (n, 2 nR )code C n for computing (p XY , p Z|XY ) is defined as a pair of stochastic maps (p M |X n , pẐ n |MY n ), where alphabet of M is {1, 2, . . . , 2 nR } (here R is called the rate of the code C n ). We call p M |X n the encoder and pẐ n |MY n the decoder. Upon observing X n , Alice maps X n to an index M according to p M |X n and sends M to Bob. Now Bob outputsẐ n according to pẐ n |M,Y n . Note that the code C n induces the following joint distribution: p X n Y n MẐ n = p X n Y n p M |X n pẐ n |MY n . We study this problem with security requirement, which is formalized next.
We say that a sequence of codes (C n ) n∈N for computing (p XY , p Z|XY ) is secure if, (i) the 1 -distance between the induced p X n Y nẐn and the desired p X n Y n Z n goes to zero as block-length tends to infinity, and (ii) the average amount of additional information Bob learns about X n from the message M , that cannot be inferred from his input and output, goes to zero as block-length tends to infinity. Definition 1. For a secure computation problem (p XY , p Z|XY ), we say that a rate R is achievable if there exists a sequence of codes (C n ) n∈N with rate R, such that for every > 0, there exists a large enough n, such that
We define the optimal rate R S as the infimum of all the achievable rates. If the set of achievable rates is empty, we say that R S = ∞; and (p XY , p Z|XY ) is said to be computable with asymptotic security, if R S is finite.
If there exists a code with n = 1 such that (1) and (2) are satisfied with = 0, then we say that (p XY , p Z|XY ) is computable with perfect security, i.e., (p XY , p Z|XY ) is computable with perfect security, if there exists p(u, x, y, z) = p XY Z (x, y, z)p(u|x, y, z) that satisfies the following Markov chains: Lemma 1 is proved in [19] . Our main result is the following theorem, which is proved in Section III.
where cardinality of U satisfies |U| ≤ |X | · |Y| · |Z| + 3.
Theorem 1 is proved in Section III. If p XY has full support, then we obtain a more explicit expression for the optimal rate. For this we first explicitly characterize securely computable (p XY , p Z|XY ), and give a direct coding scheme along with a much simpler proof of its security without resorting to the achievability proof of Theorem 1. Details are in Section IV.
For the sake of comparison, below we state a result from [16] (specialized to one-way communication setting from Alice to Bob) about the optimal rate required, denoted by R NS , for the case when there is no privacy requirement.
The randomized function p Z|XY described by the above matrix has ternary X and Z alphabets and binary Y alphabet. Specifically, X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 }, Y = {y 1 , y 2 }, and Z = {0, e, 1}, where e denotes the erasure symbol. The input distribution is as follows: p XY (x 2 , y 2 ) = p XY (x 3 , y 1 ) = 0 and p XY (x 1 , y 1 ) = p XY (x 1 , y 2 ) = p XY (x 2 , y 1 ) = p XY (x 3 , y 2 ) = 1/4. When Bob's input is y 1 , the output is always an erasure. When Bob's input is y 2 , the randomized function p Z|X,Y =y 2 behaves as an erasure channel with binary input in {x 1 , x 3 } and parameter p ∈ [0, 1]: p Z|XY (0|x 1 , y 2 ) = p Z|XY (1|x 3 , y 2 ) = 1 − p and p Z|XY (e|x 1 , y 2 ) = p Z|XY (e|x 3 , y 2 ) = p. 
where cardinality of U satisfies |U| ≤ |X | · |Y| · |Z| + 2.
The expression for R NS generalizes Wyner's common information [9] : when Y is absent, R NS is equal to the Wyner's common information between X and Z.
We evaluate the rate expressions for R S and R NS for the randomized function presented in Figure 2 , and plot the graphs in Figure 3 . It is clear from Figure 3 that, if we impose the privacy requirement, then Alice has to communicate to Bob at a strictly higher rate for all values of p in (0, 1) than what is needed when there is no privacy requirement.
III. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Achievability: Our achievable scheme uses the output statistics of random binning (OSRB) framework developed by Yassaee, Aref, and Gohari [17] . We sketch our proof here. A detailed proof can be found in the full version [19] . Fix a p U |XY Z that achieves the minimum in the expression for R S in Theorem 1. Define p UXY Z (u, x, y, z) :
to p UXY Z . To make notation less cluttered, in the following we write p(u n , x n , y n , z n ) to mean Π n i=1 p UXY Z (u i , x i , y i , z i ). We define two random mappings on U n as follows: to each sequence u n ∈ U n , assign two bins f ∈ R [2 nR ], m ∈ R [2 nR M ], independently and uniformly at random. Here m serves as the message from Alice to Bob in the actual problem, and f serves as extra randomness. Since we do not have any extra randomness in our model, later we will get rid of this by fixing an instance of it. The random binning induces the following random p.m.f. P (x n , y n , z n , u n , f, m) = p(x n , y n , z n , u n )P (f |u n )P (m|u n ).
We use the Slepian-Wolf (SW) decoder P SW (û n |f, m, y n ) to produce an estimateû n of u n from (f, m, y n ). It turns out that if R + R M > H(U |Y ), then the SW-decoder can reconstruct Fig. 3 The optimal rate expressions for R S and R NS are evaluated for the randomized function of Figure 2 . The red curve on the top is for the case when privacy is required, and the blue curve on the bottom is for the case when there is no privacy requirement. U n with low probability of error using (F, M, Y n ) and a knowledge of the binning (see [19] for details), i.e., P (x n , y n , u n , f, m,û n ) ≈ P (x n , y n , u n , f, m)1 {û n =u n } (6) This implies P (x n , y n , u n , z n , f, m,û n ) ≈ P (x n , y n , u n , z n , f, m)
Later when we remove F by conditioning on a particular instance f of it, P (x n , y n , z n |f ) may not be distributed as p(x n , y n , z n ), which we need for our correctness condition. But if R < H(U |X, Y, Z), then F becomes asymptotically independent of (X n , Y n , Z n ) (see [19] for details), i.e., P (x n , y n , z n , f) ≈ p U (f )p(x n , y n , z n ),
where p U (f ) means that f takes values uniformly at random in [2 nR ]. In order to obtain a p.m.f. that corresponds to the actual coding scheme, we can expand P (x n , y n , u n , f, m,û n , z n ) in another way as follows.
P (x n , y n , u n , f, m,û n , z n ) ≈ p U (f )p(x n , y n ) × P (u n , m,û n |x n , y n , f)p(z n |û n , y n ), (9) where we define p(z n |û n , y n ) : (9) . It follows from (7)-(9) that, if R + R M > H(U |Y ) and R < H(U |X, Y, Z) hold, then there exists a fixed binning (with corresponding p.m.f.p) such that p(x n , y n , z n , f) ≈ p U (f )p(x n , y n , z n ), (10) p U (f )p(x n , y n )p(u n , m,û n |x n , y n , f)p(z n |û n , y n ) ≈ p(x n , y n , z n , u n )p(f, m|u n )1 {û n =u n } . (11) For simplicity, define q(x n , y n , z n , u n , f, m,û n ) := p(x n , y n , z n , u n )p(f, m|u n )
q(x n , y n , z n , u n , f, m,û n ) := p U (f )p(x n , y n ) ×p(u n , m,û n |x n , y n , f)p(z n |û n , y n ).
Note thatq corresponds to the actual coding scheme, except for the extra randomness f . It follows from (10), (11), and the above two equations (by marginalizing (u n ,û n ) away) that there exists an f withp(f ) > 0 (and p U (f ) > 0) such that p(x n , y n , z n |f ) ≈ p(x n , y n , z n ), (12) q(x n , y n , z n , m|f ) ≈ q(x n , y n , z n , m|f ).
Now we show thatq(x n , y n , z n , m|f ) satisfies correctness and privacy conditions.
Note that q(x n , y n , z n |f ) =p(x n , y n , z n |f ). This together with (12) and (13) implies correctness, i.e., q(x n , y n , z n |f ) ≈ p(x n , y n , z n ). For the privacy condition, it can be shown using the Markov chain U − (Y, Z) − X that I(M ; X n |Y n , Z n )| q(x n ,y n ,z n ,m|f ) = 0. Now (13) , together with the fact that mutual information is a continuous function of the distribution, implies that I(M ; X n |Y n , Z n )|q (x n ,y n ,z n ,m|f ) → 0 as n → ∞. Note that q(x n , y n , z n , u n , m,û n |f ) = p(x n , y n )p(u n |x n , f) ×p(m|u n )p SW (û n |f, m, y n )p(z n |û n , y n ).
Identifyingp(m|x n , f) = u n :m=m(u n )p (u n |x n , f) as the encoder, and (p SW (û n |f, m, y n ), p(z n |û n , y n )) as the decoder results in a pair of encoder-decoder ensuring the security of the coding scheme. Now it follows that, for every Converse: Let (p XY , p Z|XY ) be securely computable with asymptotic security. For each > 0, there is a large enough n and a code C n that satisfies the following constraints:
We prove that the communication rate (say R) required by C n is lower-bounded by R S − δ, where δ → 0 as → 0.
We can single-letterize I(M ; X n ,Ẑ n |Y n ) (which is done in the full version [19] ) and get the following:
where δ → 0 as → 0. The random variable T in (17) is independent of (M, X n , Y n , Z n ,Ẑ n ) and is uniformly distributed in {1, 2, . . . , n}. The auxiliary random variable U in (17) is equal to (U T , T ), where for every i ∈ [n],
). This choice of U also satisfies the following Markov chains U −X T −Y T andẐ T −(U, Y T )−X T . Similar to the above single-letterization by which we obtained (17) , we can single-letterize (14)-(15) (proof is in [19] ). Now using continuity of mutual information, continuity of 1 -norm, and the fact that if (p XY , p Z|XY ) is computable with asymptotic security, it can also be computed with perfect security (details are in [19] ), we can show that R ≥ R S − δ , where δ → 0 as → 0.
IV. p XY WITH FULL SUPPORT: CHARACTERIZATION AND A SIMPLER OPTIMAL RATE EXPRESSION
If p XY has full support, then we find an explicit U that satisfies (3)-(5), which will simplify the rate-expression in Theorem 1 (see Theorem 4) . For this, we first characterize (p XY , p Z|XY ) that can be computed with perfect security, where p XY has full support. None of the proofs in this section depends on the specific distribution of p XY as long as it has full support. So the characterization remains the same for all p XY that have full support over the same alphabet X × Y.
For every y ∈ Y, define a set Z (y) = {z ∈ Z : ∃x ∈ X s.t. p Z|XY (z|x, y) > 0}. Essentially, the set Z (y) discards all those elements of Z that never appear as an output when Bob's input is y.
For y ∈ Y, define a relation ≡ y on the set Z (y) as follows: for z, z ∈ Z (y) , we say that z ≡ y z , if there is a constant c > 0 such that p Z|XY (z|x, y) = c · p Z|XY (z |x, y) for every x ∈ X .
It is easy to see that ≡ y is an equivalence relation for every y ∈ Y, which partitions Z (y) into equivalent classes. Consider a y ∈ Y, and let Z (y) = Z Suppose (p XY , p Z|XY ) is computable with perfect security, which implies that there exists p(u, x, y, z) = p XY Z (x, y, z)p(u|x, y, z) that satisfies (3)- (5) . Note that the random variable U corresponds to the message that Alice sends to Bob. We define a set U (y) i to be the set of all those messages that Alice can send to Bob, and when Bob, having y as his input outputs an element of Z i . The following claim is proved in [19] . With the help of Claim 1 we have (proof is in [19] ) that for every y, y ∈ Y, the corresponding collections of probability vectors { α 
